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Abstract
This work builds upon some long-term secular regularities concerning
the relation between consumption of energy, technological progress and eco-
nomic growth and reassesses the old question raised around forty years ago
in the “limits to growth” discussion (Meadows et al. [1972]), namely are the
current patterns of development and in particular the current patterns of
energy use environmentally sustainable?
The questions we shall address are the following. First, the environ-
mental sustainability of patterns of energy consumption that for long have
implied the notion of the environment as a free good, without any negative
social externalities and even less so any environmental threat. Second, the
importance - and limits - of relative price changes with respect to the dynam-
ics of consumption of energy. Third, the role of fundamental discontinuities
between diﬀerent “technological paradigms”.
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11 Introduction
This work builds upon some long-term secular regularities concerning the relation
between consumption of energy, technological progress and economic growth and
reassesses the old question raised around forty years ago in the “limits to growth”
discussion (Meadows et al. [1972]), namely are the current patterns of development
and in particular the current patterns of energy use environmentally sustainable?
Without the ambition to oﬀer any conclusive answer, in this work we try to
identify some critical interpretative issues and suggest some (admittedly contro-
versial) policy conclusions.
Departing points are: (a) the long-term substitution of inanimate sources of
energy for animate, starting at least with English Industrial Revolution, (b) a
slowly decreasing - on a shorter time scale - trend of energy intensity per unit
of output, at least in developed countries, as the joint outcome of total energy
consumption which continues to increase (IEA [2005]) and at the same time more
eﬃcient exploitation of energy itself, (Gr¨ uber and Naki´ cenovi´ c [1996] and Fig. 3
below).
The questions we shall address are the following:
First, the environmental sustainability of patterns of energy consumption that
for long have implied the notion of the environment as a free good, without any
negative social externalities and even less so any environmental threat.
Second, the importance - and limits - of relative price changes with respect to
the dynamics of consumption of energy.
Third, the role of fundamental discontinuities between diﬀerent “technological
paradigms”.
Given the observed trends we propose some interpretative and normative con-
jectures:
First, the proposition that “growth takes care of itself” in term of the environ-
mental consequences is analytically largely ungrounded and normatively reckless.
Second, the higher the price for fossil fuels, the better it is in the long run for
the world economy as for humankind in general.
Third, even sky-rocketing prices of fossil fuels alone might not be enough to
endogenously induce a sustainable pattern of consumption.
Major research projects involving also massive public investments in basic re-
search are needed if we want to maintain (or re-gain?) long-term environmental
sustainability.
22 The long term patterns of energy consumption
and their sustainability
Let us begin with the patterns identiﬁed by Landes [1969] who provides a care-
ful history of diﬀusion of various energy sources during and after the Industrial
Revolution.
Before the 18th century the only non-animal source of chemical work was heat
from charcoal-ﬁred furnaces. Coal had entirely replaced char-coal in England be-
fore 1800 due to prior deforestation. In the U.S. the process took longer. Inanimate
sources of work exceeded animal work in the U.S. for the ﬁrst time in 1870. How-
ever it was not until the 20th century that the contribution of fossil fuel combustion
and heat engines using fossil fuels overcame the contribution of biomass; and this
has been only the case for industrialized countries, see Ayres [2004]. Figure 1 oﬀers
an appraisal of the trends in energy1 consumption in U.S.
Somewhat surprisingly, as Fig. 1 shows, coal was able to maintain its leading
position up until the mid 20th century, due also to its role in industrial production:
indeed Fig. 2 shows that coal consumption still displays an increasing trend, with
the sole exception of Germany.
Overall, as already mentioned, the secular post-industrial revolution trends
display an exponential increase in total energy consumption notwithstanding a
slowed down over the last half century or so due to a fall in the energy intensity
per unit of GDP (at least above some level of GDP per capita): cfr. again Fig. 3
on the USA. With that go together also similar patterns in CO2 emissions since
the bulk of the increase in energy use has involved fossil fuels.
Are such patterns sustainable in the long-run?
As many recall, the ﬁrst spur in such debate occurred in the early seventies
around the “Club of Rome” manifesto in turn grounded in forecast of the simula-
tion exercise by Forrester and colleagues at MIT (Meadows et al. [1972]).
Within that discussion the major emphasis was on the limit to growth related
to resource availability coupled with rapid population growth and after 1973, by
the rising trend in oil prices and declining growth in output in many industrialized
countries (see also Nordhaus [1992]).
Those who stood on the pessimists’ side, argued that on the basis of the MIT
models, disaster could be avoided only by zero population growth and zero eco-
nomic growth from year 2000 on. Optimists - which at the time included Chris
1The term energy as used in everyday discussion - economics included - is technically incorrect
(see, Ayres et al. [2003]) as it means conserved quantity. Therefore, it cannot be “used up” but
only converted from available to unavailable forms. The correct term in this context is exergy,
which is roughly speaking, “available energy” or “potentially useful” energy. Having said that
we conform to the existing terminology adopted in economics and we reiterate the misuse of the
word energy consumption.
3Figure 1: Energy Consumption by Source, 1635-2004 Source DOE/EIA [2004]
Freeman and collaborators at the Science Policy Research Unit at Sussex - argued
that growth could continue, provided that the two following conditions were to be
met: (a) a combination of institutional changes that led to diﬀerent path of world
development (with more emphasis on sustainability) and (b) a re-orientation of
world R&D so that environmental objectives could be given higher priority (see
Freeman [1992]).
The scenario drawn by the Club of Rome turned out be overpessimistic in
assessing the importance of natural resources shortage in constraining economic
growth. At the same time the scenario was heavily optimistically biased in re-
lation to the environmental impact of pollutant emissions into the environment
in general and the impact of energy use on climate in particular. As Brock and
Taylor [2004] vividly put it: “Recently it has become clear that limits to growth
may not only arise from nature’s ﬁnite source of raw materials, but instead from
nature’s limited ability to act as a sink for human wastes.” A much more reason-
able setting to assess the interactions of human activities and the ecosystem is to
frame it in terms of the twofold role of source and sink played by the environment,
with the sink role and its long-term eﬀect in the forefront. In fact, in our view
the Club of Rome warnings massively underestimated the powers of technological
progress with respect to the access to/ exploitation of natural resources. Knowl-
edge accumulation has made wonders in disproving dismal predictions dating back
in economics at least to Ricardo and Malthus. Contrary to the Ricardian intuition
on scarce factors of production very little by ways of decreasing returns to resources
availability (including energy) have played out over the last two centuries. Rather
technology-driven dynamic increasing returns exerted their powerful inﬂuence also
in agricultural, mining and energy extraction.
Conversely the crucial long-term sustainability issue regards, we suggest, the
compatibility between current patterns of resources use - and in particular energy
use - and environmental dynamics. The latter include, of course, greenhouse eﬀects
by now abundantly documented. Hence, even granted the ability of nature to
4Figure 2: World Coal Consumption, 1950-2004 Source DOE/EIA [2004]
Figure 3: Energy Use per Dollar of GDP Source DOE/EIA [2004]
partly fulﬁll its “sink role” what are the limits of its recycling capacity? And on
the other side what is the relationship between rates of environmental waste and
development?
Environmental Kuznets Curves
The statistical features of the relationship between energy consumption and levels
of development are often summarized by means of the so-called “Kuznets curve”
As Dasgupta et al. [2002] put it (p. 147):
“The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) posits an inverted-U rela-
tionship between pollution and economic developments. Kuznets name
was apparently attached to the curve by Grossman and Krueger [1994],
who noted its resemblance to Kuznets’s inverted-U relationship be-
tween income inequality and development.”
5Revised EKC






Figure 4: Environmental Kuznets Curve. Source Dasgupta et al. [2002]
Diﬀerent versions of the EKC characterized by diﬀerent degrees of optimism
are illustrated in ﬁgure 4. Dasgupta et al. [2002] and Stern [2004b] oﬀer two quite
comprehensive reviews of the literature on the subject.
Their most optimistic interpretations have been popularized, not too surpris-
ingly, by the World Bank’s World Development Report 1992 which argued that:
The view that greater economic activity inevitably hurts the environ-
ment is based on static assumptions about technology, tastes and en-
vironmental investment (IBRD [1992], p. 38).
Should the EKC be veriﬁed the take-away message would be: Grow ﬁrst, then
clean up: i.e. the so-called “too poor to be green” hypothesis (Martinez-Alier
[1995]).
Clearly, if supported by the data, the EKC, especially in its most optimistic
versions (cf. the two lower curves in Fig. 4), would apparently suggest that, ﬁrst,
a path to environmental sustainable growth is available for developing countries,
given existing techniques and, of course, that second, developed countries are al-
ready following it. Emerging economies would only need to “replicate” the growth
path already set by more advanced economies.
The most robust evidence supporting EKC is for developed countries, as for
these countries more data on emissions and longer time-series are available.
de Bruyn et al. [1998] spell out some possible drivers of EKC (at least for
local air pollutants): ﬁrst, one tends to observe positive income elasticities for
6environmental quality; second, structural change in production and consumption
toward “good” environmental friendly directions tend to be associated with higher
per capita income; third, information on environmental consequences of economic
activities increases with income levels.
Granted that what is the evidence supporting the EKC, and what does it
imply?
Some Statistical evidence on EKC
Let us consider the following basic “reduced form” model largely tested in the
literature (de Bruyn et al. [1998], pp. 163 and 164):




i,t + β4t + β5Vi,t (1)
where, E is “environmental pressure” (however deﬁned), Y is per capita income,
i stands for a country index, t is a time index, Vt reﬂects other variables that
inﬂuences the relation between Y and E. Clearly the picture would be coherent
with the traditional EKC for β1 > 0, β2 < 0 and β3 = 0.
The typical approach to test the EKC has been to regress cross-country mea-
sures of environmental and water qualities on various speciﬁcations of income per
capita. Most of these studies rely on the Global Environmental Monitoring System
(GEMS), sponsored by U.N., which collects data on pollution both in developed
and developing countries.
Researchers are far from agreement on the empirical goodness of ﬁt of an EKC
type model. For example, according to Stern [1998] the evidence on a U-shaped
relation only applies to some air pollutants such as suspended particulates and
sulfur dioxide.
Bandyopadhyay and Shaﬁk [1992] correlate ten types of environmental pressure
with per capita income for a panel of up to 149 countries for various time intervals
between 1960 and 1990. Only two types of environmental pressure, urban air
concentrations of SPM and SO2, follow an EKC according to their estimates.
Emissions of CO2, an indicator for water pollution and the amount of municipal
solid waste per capita satisfy a monotonic, positive relation with per capita income.
Bertinelli and Strobl [2005] propose a semi-parametric approach to the EKC
with the consequent advantage of allowing for higher ﬂexibility in accounting for
the relation between income per capita and some measure of pollution. They
ﬁnd a linear relation, with pollution increasing with country wealth for low level
of GDP/capita and becoming ﬂat thereafter. The only exception to linearity is for
very high GDP/capita ratios, with the disclaimer that due to very few observations
in the higher tail, the curve is poorly estimated2.
2They also note that a source of bias could be in the unit root of the time series for pollutant
7Figure 5: Energy Consumption Per Person, U.S.A. Source DOE/EIA [2004]
Stern [2004b] suggests that structural factors on both the input and output
side do play a role in modifying the gross scale eﬀect though they are mostly less
inﬂuential than time-related eﬀects. The income elasticities of emissions are likely
to be less than one–but not negative in wealthy countries as proposed by EKC
hypothesis. Further, the author also notice that most of the studies supporting
the EKC might exaggerate any apparent decline in pollution intensity with rising
income. Indeed, in our ﬁnite world the poor countries of today would be unable
to ﬁnd other countries from which to import resource-intensive products as they
become richer. As a result, future research on this issue has to account also
for the eﬀects of pollution regulations on trade. With this respect Levinson and
Taylor [2004] ﬁnd - very reasonably - that those industries whose abatement costs
increased most have seen the largest relative increases in net imports.
Moreover, thousands of potentially toxic materials remain untested and un-
regulated. Such an issue also aﬀects the analysis of the eﬀects of environmental
regulation, both in developed and developing countries.
There is nearly a paradox here in that when the evidence of a damage is beyond
any reasonable doubt it might be also when it is too late to revert the course of
events. Further, some scholars suggest that even if some EKC relationship existed
in the past, it is unlikely to persist in the future because of the pressures that
global competition places on environmental regulations; the so called race to the
bottom (Dasgupta et al. [2002]3: see again Fig. 4).
emissions. Thus, they proceed to ﬁrst-diﬀerence the series. Nonetheless, their estimates for both
sulfur and carbon dioxide emissions suggest that the relationship still appear to be linear.
3Moreover, the “new toxics” scenario claims that while some traditional pollutants might
have an inverted U-shape curve, the new pollutants that are replacing them do not.
8Figure 6: Energy Consumption by Source, History and Projections 1949-2025. Source
DOE/EIA [2004]
Decomposing the determinants of energy use and environmental pres-
sure
Given the highly controversial empirical evidence on EKC further insights might
be drawn from dynamic frameworks explicitly disentangling the diverse underlying
relations between growth, energy consumption and pollution4.





where Et is emission in year t for a given country, Y is GDP, Ij is the emission
intensity of sector j and Sj is the share of that sector in the country’s economy.
Such a representation allows to analyze emissions accounting for scale, (sectoral)
composition and technique eﬀects. Equation (2) is in fact an identity since Ijt =
Ejt/Yjt and Sjt = Yjt/Yt and can be used to distinguish various factors which
inﬂuence on emissions. Diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to time we can
write:
ˆ E = ˆ Y +
n X
j=1
ej ˆ Sj +
n X
j=1
ej ˆ Ij (3)
where ej = Ej/E is the share of emissions of sector j in total emissions and
ˆ X = [dX/dt]/X.
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of equation (3), ˆ Y , accounts for the
eﬀects on emissions directly related to scale, i.e. to the growth of the size of the
4Needless to say, such a decomposition is only possible when detailed data about the economy













Table 1: Contributions to total change in global sulfur emissions. Source Stern
[2002].
economy holding constant the composition of the economy and, broadly speaking,
the technology as proxied by the intensity of emissions, while the two other terms
on the right-hand side precisely account fo the latter5.




















where S is sulfur emissions; P population; Yit/Pit is scale as proxied by GDP-
capita; At is a common global time eﬀect representing emissions speciﬁc technical
progress over years t; Eit/Yit is energy intensity; y1it/Yit, ..., ynit/Yit represent
the composition eﬀect and e1it/Eit, ..., ekit/Eit is the input-mix given by the
share of diﬀerent energy sources e in total energy use E. Additionally, γi is the
relative eﬃciency of country i compared to best practice, and εit is a random error
term.
The results of the empirical analysis, which we report in Table 1 show that
input and composition eﬀects globally contributed very little, even though they
might be important for certain countries. The two components accounting for
technological change (At and Eit/Yit) limit the increase in emissions to half, but
are unable to prevent them from increasing.
5Clearly, equation (3) requires a discretization for empirical applications.
10Wing and Eckaus [2004] carefully review the existing empirical works and iden-
tify the following “stylized facts”:
• Declining aggregate energy intensity (notwithstanding an upward trend in
its total use);
• Evidence of induced energy-saving innovations at the micro level, associated
with signiﬁcant energy-saving technological change in a number of energy-
intensive manufacturing industries;
• Indications of the embodiment of energy-saving innovations in durable goods;
• (Somewhat at odds with the evidence mentioned above) structural change
as a signiﬁcant source of reduction in aggregate energy intensity;
Wing and Eckaus [2004] suggest that in the most recent period innovations
embodying information technology in electrical capital goods played an important
role in energy intensity decline (see Fig. 8). The issue of reductions in energy
intensity is not a simple one.
There have been a number of energy saving inﬂuences: changes in the
sectoral composition of the economy, changes in the scale of its con-
stituent sectors, as well as substitution due to shifts in the relative
prices of energy and other variable inputs. [...] In particular, a signif-
icant portion of the energy-saving technical changes we observe may
have been the coincidental result of innovations which were intended
to accelerate production, reduce both labor and capital costs, or make
use of alternative materials (Wing and Eckaus [2004], p. 19).
The bottom line is that technical progress - possibly together with structural
change - has barely succeeded in stabilizing and even marginally decreasing energy
consumption per capita, in high income countries: see ﬁgure 8 and 5 for the U.S.
evidence. However demography heavily plays against any stabilization, let alone
reduction of total energy consumption and of emissions in the environment.
Demography, energy consumption and emissions
Indeed, the evidence on the past and the most likely projections for the future sug-
gest a massive overall growth of energy consumption (cf. Fig. 6) and of emissions,
with some increases even in high income countries: see Fig. 9.
The picture is even bleaker for other sources of emissions: cf. Fig. 7 on the
projections concerning total sulfur emissions.
In order to be more precise in identifying the importance of demographic fac-
tors in shaping such patterns, one has to identify the elasticity - i.e. the percentage
11Figure 7: Projected Sulfur Emission Source Stern et al. [1996]
change - in energy use or emissions resulting from a corresponding change in the
population. In this respect, when considering per capita emissions, the EKC ap-
proach - discussed above - often implicitly assume an elasticity to population of
one. Note that, while this is not necessarily the most accurate estimate, it would
spell doom for any hope of emission reduction, given the current and projected
growth of world population.
Some - including the so-called IPAT model (standing for “Impact Population
Aﬄuence per capita Technology”: cf. Ehrlich and Holdren [1971]) and others
(see Shi [2003], Cole and Neumayer [2004], Dietz and Rosa [1997]) - do indeed
account explicitly for demographics eﬀects. The estimates - it turns out - yield
elasticities which are in the neighborhood of one. Hence, other things being equal,
even neglecting the eﬀects on both energy consumption and emissions of growing
per capita incomes, one should expect at least their doubling over the next three
decades as a sheer eﬀect of population growth.
3 What can technical progress do? And where
does it come from?
Can technological advances reduce energy use and emissions in such a way to
compensate the eﬀect of both per capita income growth and demographics?
We have already seen that energy-saving changes in production techniques
appeared to have signiﬁcantly contributed to the fall of energy intensity of GDP
12Figure 8: U.S. Energy Intensity and Energy Prices, 1958-1996 Source Wing and Eckaus [2004]
- at least at relatively high levels of development. Could the rate of technological
progress be increased to the extent of providing a full compensation for growth
and demography?
The answer, we suggest is largely negative.
In order to see that, let us make use of the distinction introduced a while ago in
Dosi [1982] between “normal” technological progress occurring within established
technological paradigms and “extra-ordinary” discontinuities associated with the
emergence of new ones. For the purpose of this discussion, diverse paradigms
- with their distinct knowledge bases and “trajectories” of advance - tend to be
associated with distinct energy sources and modes of generation of heat, electricity
and motion. Thus, the generation of electricity through fossil fuel and through
nuclear ﬁssion are associated with two distinct technological paradigms. Similarly,
the use of systems of locomotion based on the internal combustion engine is at the
core of the current dominant paradigm of automobile design and production, etc.
In turn, it happens that market prices and other forms of “inducement” are
indeed able to “tune up” or slow down the rates of technological change, but this
happens within the relatively narrow boundaries set by the nature of the incumbent
knowledge bases (the incumbent paradigm). So, for example, the price of energy
may have some eﬀects upon energy use in steel production but only within the
rather strict limits set by the procedures we currently know on how to transform
the iron oxide input. And these constraints to price-induced input savings appear
to be the general case in contemporary production paradigms.
A good case to the point is precisely the eﬀect of the “oil shocks” (consider
together ﬁgure 10, 8 and 6) which did indeed signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the time series
of petroleum consumption. Nevertheless, soon thereafter consumption resumed to
13Figure 9: GDP Growth and Carbon Dioxide Emissions Source DOE/EIA [2004]
Figure 10: Fossil Fuel Production Prices, 1950-2004 Source DOE/EIA [2004]
its path of almost steady growth.
Still under the “inducement” rubric, public regulations have turned out to be
a rather eﬀective mean of inﬂuencing the patterns of energy use and of emissions6.
In a curious paradox in the literature and in a good deal of policy debate one
has both underestimated the environmental impact of the negative externalities
stemming from production and locomotion and correspondingly overestimated the
cost of regulation.
In fact, as Porter and van der Linde [1995] argue, regulatory constraints may
not be as costly as one could expect because of the possibility that regulation itself
might spur innovative activities and lead to the discovery of “new ways of doing
things”7.
There is a general lesson here: imported price shocks might exert an important
6More generally on the factors inﬂuencing the so-called “environmental” innovations see Maz-
zanti and Zoboli [2006].
7The authors support this interpretation providing a series successful case studies.
14inﬂuence on the energy intensity of particular energy sources but dramatic changes
in their use can only be made possible by the emergence and diﬀusion of new
technological paradigms: in the case of electricity generation these are plausibly
nuclear power and, eventually, photovoltaic and nuclear fusion; and, in the domain
of locomotion, hydrogen-based means of transportation.
Conversely, despite the theoretical inclinations of the economists, the notion
that changes in relative prices may induce substitution among inputs - in particu-
lar between energy and capital - tend to be a far-fetched idea with little empirical
support. The general case is, on the contrary, that of a complementary relation be-
tween energy resources and manufactured capital (Stern [2004a], Smulders [2005],
Landes [1969], Cleveland [2004]; see also the special issue of Ecological Economics
Vol. 22 Issue 3, 1997. (Daly [1997])). Frank [1959] reports that the correlation co-
eﬃcient between consumption of energy and manufactured capital is surprisingly
high; 0.9995 for the period 1880-1948 in U.S8. Indeed, technological advancement
has reduced, for a given level of consumption of energy, the need for manufactured
capital. Nevertheless, this trend has been counterbalanced by a corresponding
trend in mechanization, which has substituted capital to work of manpower or
animals.
4 Some Policy Suggestions by way of a Conclu-
sion
The diﬀusion of diﬀerent sources and forms of energy as well as the environmental
problems to which they are closely related provide an excellent example of the
“evolutionary” nature of processes of growth and development. As Kemp and
Soete [1990] which points out how the “current environmental problems stem from
the accumulation of small eﬀects, which at some point in time appear to exceed
the critical boundaries of the ecosystem or at least the public perception of those
boundaries. They represent a typical example of an evolutionary process in which
apparently small events, developing in a certain direction during a long period of
time, lead to considerable change.”
What is certain in our view is that the cumulative eﬀect of such big and small
evolutionary changes will not take care of itself as the most optimistic proponents
of “Environmental Kuznets Curve” appear to suggest. Most likely an explosive
demography let running until a new “steady state” forecasted somewhere between
12 and 20 billion inhabitants would be suﬃcient to lead beyond a disaster threshold
which in fact some analysts belief that we have already passed (cf. Ehrlich and
8Incidentally, Landes [1969] wonders if it really makes sense to bear all troubles related to
capital measurement, when energy use provides such a good proxy.
15Ehrlich [1990]).
At the same time, it is hard to see how on the grounds of current technological
paradigms one could reach zero net emissions of CO2 - not to mention negative
net emissions which would be required in order to reverse the current greenhouse
eﬀect.
Hence, unsustainability is looming not for reasons of scarcity as it was claimed
three decades ago but in a sense for lack of scarcity - at least with respect to energy
availability and consumption.
What to do then? Here are some proposals from the modest to the nearly
impossible.
First, prices and regulatory measures, we have argued, have limited “induce-
ment eﬀects” but do have some. Hence, it is urgent to revive also the regulatory
side which nowadays tends to be neglected in favor of more incentive-centered,
supposedly “market-friendly” measures such as the development of markets for
pollution permits.
As Nelson and Winter [1982] put it:
“The processes of change are continually tossing up new “externali-
ties” that must be dealt with in some manner or other. In a regime
in which technical advance is occurring and organizational structure is
evolving in response to changing patterns of demand and supply, new
nonmarket interactions that are not contained adequately by prevailing
laws and policies are almost certain to appear, and old ones may dis-
appear. Long-lasting chemical insecticides were not a problem eighty
years ago. Horse manure polluted the cities but automotive emissions
did not. The canonical “externalities” problem of evolutionary theory
is the generation by new technologies of beneﬁts and costs that old
institutional structures ignore.” (Nelson and Winter [1982], p.368.)
Indeed a much greater bona ﬁde eﬀort ought to go in the early identiﬁcation
of “negative externalities” and the development of institutions and (generally in-
ternational) policy measures apt to cope with them.
Second, one should consider high prices of fossil fuels as a blessing rather than
a curse. Of course there is, associated with it, a serious distributive problem which
is not possible to discuss here. However, one should worry even more if some fossil
fuels - as especially the most polluting one, coal - remains relatively cheap.
Third, it is unfair and unpractical to demand that emerging economies pay
the full cost of “greener” patterns of production: only a mix of (i) mechanisms of
preferential treatment of “greener” commodities and (ii) international transfer of
less polluting technologies is likely to lower the peaks of whatever EKCs, if they
exist at all.
16Fourth, we have mentioned above that massive reductions in the levels of net
emissions - to repeat, as such a necessary condition for long-term environmental
sustainability - are likely to come only with the development of new technological
paradigms.
On the grounds of what we know now the photovoltaic appear to be the most
promising one, with, maybe, fusion, in a future further away. The emergence of
new paradigms, however, generally demands major advances in basic and applied
research sponsored to a good extent by public agencies. Massive “mission-oriented”
projects in this area by the ensemble of developed countries are an urgent must.
Finally, possibly the most diﬃcult issue: introduce measures aimed at the fast
stabilization of population level well before the “natural asymptotic levels” from
current forecasts.
The alternative is probably the “evolution toward collapse” brilliantly described
by Diamond [2005] in several occurrences of “suicidal civilization” from the past.
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